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I. INTRODUCTION
HE affirmative action debate which began in 1978 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke' has continued over the years. The litigation and contro-
versy has generally been associated with the awarding of government
contracts2 and with business hiring and firing practices.3 Since Bakke, the
Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue of affirmative action
policies in graduate school admissions. A recent Texas case 4 and the ac-
tions by the University of California ("U.C.") Board of Regents during
the summer of 1996 have brought the affirmative action issue back into
the limelight. This Comment will discuss the development of affirmative
action policies generally and in the graduate school context. The Com-
ment will then provide an extensive discussion of Hopwood v. Texas,
U.C.'s actions, and the effects that these occurrences could have on af-
firmative action policies throughout the United States. The resulting con-
clusion will be that preferential admissions of minorities to graduate
schools are no longer needed and should be abandoned in favor of pro-
grams that assist socially and economically disadvantaged people, without
consideration of skin color. To ensure that minorities have an equal
chance at achieving the grades and the test scores necessary to gain ad-
mittance to graduate schools, lower level education must be improved.
This can be accomplished by improving the quality of instruction at the
middle school and high school levels or through initiating tutorial pro-
grams that help minorities achieve admission to graduate schools under
color-blind admissions policies.
II. THE HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Affirmative action policies have not been in effect for many years. But
judicial decisions preceding the programs laid the groundwork for the
policies. The decision in Plessy v. Ferguson5 may have signified the birth
of the "separate but equal" doctrine in 1896, but Justice Harlan's dissent
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (involving a state medical school's policy of reserving a specific
number of spaces in its entering class for minority students).
2. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding statute that required con-
tractors to use qualified minority business enterprises).
3. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating a scheme that
granted black teachers greater protection from layoffs than white teachers).
4. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy involved a Louisiana statute that said a railroad had to
provide separate but equal facilities for whites and people of color. Id at 540. The statute
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foreshadowed things to come. He was the first Justice to recognize the
potential effects of restricting both races, even on an equal basis. He ob-
served that the separation of the races would only instill hatred between
them6 and that the doctrine was really not an equal restriction of both
races.
7
After Plessy announced the separate but equal doctrine, numerous
cases followed which analyzed the issue of whether or not separate facili-
ties were in fact equal. 8 These cases demonstrated the problem with the
doctrine, and it was only a matter of time before the doctrine was over-
ruled in the landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education.9 The Court
had tired of analyzing each claim on a case by case basis to determine
whether or not the equality issue had been satisfied. The majority finally
realized that separate but equal was inherently unequal. It was obvious
that the black students' schools were significantly inferior and that black
and white children did not have the same educational opportunities. 10
The demise of the separate but equal doctrine illustrated the Court's
growing sensitivity towards the plight of minorities in the educational
arena. The Brown decision laid the groundwork for the development of
affirmative action policies in graduate school admissions.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN GRADUATE
SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
A. THE EARLY YEARS
After Brown rejected the separate but equal doctrine, law schools em-
ployed another method of keeping blacks out of "their" law schools: they
included questions regarding race on the admissions forms." Thus, most
people attempting to increase minority enrollment were opposed to the
presence of these questions on admissions forms.' 2
An admissions policy that does not consider race sounds like an ideal
goal. But some unbelievable statistics resulted from "color blind" admis-
sions. In 1965, only 1.3% of the law students in the United States were
black, while 5.5% of the undergraduate population was black.' 3 Even
more troublesome, in 1970, 12% of the U.S. population was black, while
was upheld on the basis that the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution should not be
used to try to attain social equality. Id. at 551-52.
6. Id. at 560.
7. Id. at 557.
8. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that equal
protection was denied when a black man was denied admission to a Missouri law school,
but his education in another state was funded by Missouri); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950) (holding that "parallel" black law school in Texas was so unequal that the State was
forced to admit the minority to the University of Texas ("U.T.") Law School).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Id. at 495.
11. Anthony J. Scanlon, The History and Culture of Affirmative Action, 1988 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 343, 348.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 349.
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only 1% of U.S. lawyers were black.14 Such a discrepancy in enrollment
figures and minority representation in the legal profession indicated a
glaring problem that needed to be solved.
The discrepancy resulted in the development of some early programs
that focused on admitting numerous minorities who would otherwise not
have been admitted under the then-existing admissions policies.15 In
1966, Harvard began the first such program, known as CLEO (Council on
Legal Education Opportunities). The Harvard program and others in-
vited certain minority students to participate in summer programs that
helped prepare them for the possibility of admission to law school. Ex-
ceptional performance during this program allowed them to be admitted
to law school in the following term.16 Such programs became popular
because they were inexpensive and allowed the preservation of the first-
year curriculum because they took place in the summer.' 7 But the pro-
grams also had numerous problems, and new programs needed to be de-
veloped to achieve a more representative mix of students in first-year law
classes.18 What developed is known today as preferential admissions
policies.
Most preferential admissions policies are based on Law School Admis-
sions Test (LSAT) scores and undergraduate grade point averages-ob-
jective criteria upon which law schools determine admission. Many years
ago, it was not really necessary to use these numerical standards. But due
to the increase in the number of people applying to professional schools,
the schools had to devise a way to efficiently select qualified students.19
The LSAT was created to assist in the process and has become one of the
most important factors.20 The development of these objective criteria
opened the door for preferential admissions to be actively utilized.
B. THE BAKKE DECISION
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2' a white male who
had applied to the medical school at U.C.-Davis brought an action chal-
14. Id. The problem was not limited to blacks. In 1970 there were only 24 Native
American lawyers in the U.S. and less than 100 Puerto Rican lawyers in the continental
U.S. Id.
15. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) was instrumental in helping to
establish a remedial English program at Texas Southern University for its minority stu-
dents. The program was implemented because minorities had been disadvantaged through
the use of the earlier program of separate but equal. Id.
16. Id. at 350-51.
17. Id. at 351. Many foundations help fund these programs, and often the faculty
would volunteer their time to teach the minorities. By not affecting the first-year law
school curriculum, these programs avoided integrating minorities into the overall student
population. Id.
18. Id at 351-52. The goal of increased enrollment was not achieved with these pro-
grams because many of the minority students who were invited to these programs were
already accepted at other law schools. Id.
19. Eulius Simien, The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost Twenty
Years of Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 359, 370-86 (1987).
20. Id. at 374.
21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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lenging the school's special admissions program after his application was
rejected. The school had specifically reserved sixteen of the one hundred
spots in its entering classes for minorities.22 The school used separate
admissions programs to help fulfill its quota.23
Bakke applied to the medical school in 1973 and 1974 and was rejected
both times, even though many of the applicants under the special admis-
sions program were admitted with lower scores.24 Bakke claimed a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment25 as
well as violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26
In his majority opinion, Justice Powell addressed the argument that
whites did not need extra protection because they were not a "discrete
and insular minority. '27 Powell felt that although whites had not been a
historically disadvantaged group, they were entitled to invoke the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 He stated that all types of racial
classifications would be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis 29 and that the
admissions policies of the medical school had to be necessary to accom-
plish a compelling state objective. 30
The medical school claimed that the purposes of its admissions policy
were to decrease the deficit of minorities in the medical field, remedy
discrimination in society, increase the representation of physicians in cer-
tain communities, and "obtain[ ] the educational benefits that flow from
22. Id. at 275.
23. Id. at 275-76. U.C.-Davis admitted some applicants under the regular admissions
procedure while admitting others under a special admissions procedure. The regular ad-
missions program admitted students based upon consideration of the following criteria:
undergraduate GPA, MCAT scores, letters of recommendation, and interview ratings. The
special admissions program used similar factors but did not require a minimum GPA, as
required by the regular admissions policy. Applicants were considered for admission
under the special admissions program if they indicated that they were either "economically
and/or educationally disadvantaged" or a member of a "minority group." Id.
24. See id. at 277. Bakke's GPA was 3.46. In 1973 and 1974, the overall GPA for
applicants admitted under the special admissions program was 2.88 and 2.62, respectively.
Also, in both years the MCAT scores of special admittees were much lower than Bakke's
score.
25. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
27. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938)).
28. Id. at 293-94. See Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Af-
firmative Action, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 923, 934 (1995). Although whites are not really a
"discrete and insular minority," if judges had to continue to make decisions like whether or
not a certain group fit this description, they would be "relying on nothing more than the
'ebb and flow of political forces"' in their determination. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at
298).
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.").
30. Strict scrutiny involves this analysis. Id. at 267.
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an ethnically diverse student body."'31 Powell summarily rejected the first
goal because its purpose was to admit a certain class of people simply
because of their skin color-a purpose he believed completely impermis-
sible.32 While remedying discrimination in society is obviously a satisfac-
tory goal, it was not a valid goal in this case. For a remedial goal to be
valid, past discrimination by that specific entity must be identified. 33 In
this case, the university was attempting to remedy the discrimination
present in society as a whole. Thus, people who had little or nothing to
do with the past discrimination would be punished for the behavior of
others.34
Powell then considered the idea that the policies help increase the
number of physicians in certain communities.35 In his opinion, the goal of
increasing the number of physicians in certain communities was the
weakest. The theory was that by admitting people who were disadvan-
taged minorities, there would be more medical graduates in the coming
years who would be more inclined to practice in locations where there
was a significant lack of doctors.36 Powell rejected this argument because
of the problems of prediction and lack of proof. 37
Powell did, however, see merit in the goal of having a diverse student
body. This goal satisfied the compelling state objective prong.38 Because
the diversity goal was compelling, Powell applied the second prong of
strict scrutiny to determine whether the methods used were necessary for
its accomplishment.39 Powell quickly concluded that the use of a strict
quota system, by which a specific number of minorities were admitted, 40
was not necessary to achieve a diverse student body; there clearly was a
better way to achieve this goal.41 Powell would allow race to be used as a
"plus" factor in admissions, but only to that extent.42 Powell was particu-
31. Id. at 306.
32. "Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic
origin is discrimination for its own sake." Id. at 307.
33. Id. at 309.
34. Id. at 310. Here, Powell advances one of the classic arguments for the elimination
of affirmative action: many people now applying to graduate schools were not even born
when the discrimination of the 1960s and previous decades took place. This argument will
be revisited throughout this Comment.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 310-11.
37. Id at 311.
38. Id. at 311-12 ("The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so es-
sential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body.").
39. Id. at 314-15.
40. Although the special admissions program technically was available to "economi-
cally and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants as well as members of minority
groups, in a four-year period, not one disadvantaged white applicant was admitted under
the special program. Id at 265-66.
41. Id. at 316-17. Harlan looked at Harvard's procedures as a model. These proce-
dures considered race just like any other factor. Harvard would basically treat the minor-
ity characteristic just like membership on an athletic team in college would be considered.
No greater weight would be given.
42. Id.
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larly upset that nonminority applicants had been denied the opportunity
to compete for all of the seats in the entering class, while minorities were
given a fair shot at every seat in the class. 43 As a result of this opinion,
Bakke was admitted to the medical school." Thus began the controversy
over affirmative action programs that seemed to involve "reverse
discrimination."
C. VIEWS ON THE BAKKE DECISION
The Bakke decision understandably elicited many commentaries and
law review articles on the merits of affirmative action policies. Some
commentators believe that the quota systems that were disallowed in
Bakke are permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. They argue
that a quota system is the only effective way of increasing the representa-
tion of minorities in the professional disciplines.45 But one must not for-
get that the proper goal of affirmative action policies in graduate schools
simply should not be to increase the representation of minorities in the
profession. This argument was rejected in the Bakke decision. 6 The
commentators in this area have failed to realize that there are other
methods of achieving this goal.
One possibility is to improve many of the inner-city schools and better
prepare minority students. This would give students a better chance at
succeeding in college and achieving the grades and test scores necessary
to be admitted to professional schools, without the need for affirmative
action programs. Also, parents of minorities can provide the encourage-
ment necessary for their children to aggressively pursue a professional
career. Further, more scholarship programs can be designed to help de-
fray the cost of an expensive professional education. Students would
then be assured that finances would not separate them from their desired
career if they continue to achieve high marks in school. These and other
possibilities, which will be discussed later in this Comment, defeat the
alleged necessity of a quota.
At first glance, the "plus-factor" approach developed in Bakke seems
to be a valid method of solving the problem. But the suggestion has been
raised that without the quota, hidden discrimination may result.47 The
belief is that without a quota system, universities will be able to say that
they have a program, but can reject minority applicants, claiming that
43. Id. at 319-20.
44. Id at 320.
45. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action:
Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1043, 1054-55 (advocating the use of
quotas in the admissions process because minorities are "still woefully underrepresented"
in the legal profession (of the 23,195 partners in the 250 largest law firms of the United
States, less than 1% are black)); Simien, supra note 19, at 360 ("Blacks are so under-
represented in law school student bodies that there is no realistic possibility that their num-
bers in the bar will significantly increase in the foreseeable future.").
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
47. See Johnson, supra note 45, at 1056 (urging that unless specific numbers are used,
the majority can continue to cause underrepresentation of minorities in the legal field).
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factors other than race accounted for the low enrollment figures for mi-
norities. The classic example is the so-called "pool problem." Under this
theory, universities are able to implement threshold admission require-
ments and then claim that the underrepresentation of minorities is due to
the fact that there were not enough minorities in the admissions pool who
met the stringent requirements.48 This is a valid concern, but one would
hope that in today's society we are past many of the racist attitudes that
were prevalent in past decades. Even if we are not, the best way to
change society is not through court-ordered standards, but through edu-
cation and continued understanding of the plight of minorities. The
Bakke decision was a landmark case in the affirmative action arena, but
there is room for improvement on its rationale.
IV. POST-BAKKE DECISIONS
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of affirmative
action in graduate school admissions since the Bakke decision, it has ad-
dressed several related issues. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education in-
volved minority school teachers who were given some protection from
layoffs.49 Once again, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was invoked. 50 The problem in Wygant was that race was
the main factor in deciding who would lose their job.51 This sounds very
similar to the approach used in the Bakke case. In holding the school
board's practice unconstitutional, the Court stressed that the loss of an
existing job was much more damaging than the denial of future employ-
ment.52 Even though the Court again stated that remedying past discrim-
ination was a proper goal of the school board, the means for achieving
the goal were not narrowly tailored. 53
This case is helpful in the analysis of affirmative action policies because
it identifies a line that may not be crossed when applying these policies.
A plausible argument can be made that causing people to lose their job in
an effort to encourage minority employment might be a better policy than
implementing hiring goals. Considering the age of the people who might
be laid off under this system, one could argue that they were in fact work-
ing when the discrimination was taking place. Therefore, any goal of
48. See id. at 1067-68.
49. 476 U.S. 267, 267 (1986).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 271-72. An earlier suit was brought by minority teachers who had been laid
off even though technically they should have been retained under the union agreement.
After this case was filed, the school board followed the agreement with the union and laid
off the teachers prescribed by the agreement. Those laid off turned out to be nonminority
teachers with greater seniority.
52. Id. at 282-83.
53. Id. at 283-84. The Court believed that hiring goals could be used that would
achieve the same goal of remedying past discrimination. The problem with the layoff poli-
cies was that they could cause a serious disruption in the lives of certain people who possi-
bly could have invested their entire lives in the school and expected to work there until
they retired. Id.
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remedying past discrimination would be better attained by making these
people pay for it. At first this argument might seem absurd, but it is cer-
tainly less absurd than making people suffer who had nothing to do with
the discrimination of the 1950s and 1960s, as they were not even born at
that time.
Another major case after the Bakke decision involved public contracts.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,5 4 the City of Richmond implemented
a plan by which contractors who had been awarded city contracts were
forced to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of the
project to minority business enterprises.5 5 Because there was neither evi-
dence of racial discrimination in Richmond nor evidence that the city's
contractors had ever discriminated against any of the minority subcon-
tractors, the program was found to be unconstitutional.5 6 Even more
convincing to Justice O'Connor in this case was the fact that the Rich-
mond program defined "minority" as including not only African-Ameri-
cans but also Orientals, Eskimos, and Aleut people-even though there
was no evidence that these other minorities had ever been the victims of
discrimination in Richmond.5 7 To the Court, the inclusion of these peo-
ple within the definition of "minority" further demonstrated that this pro-
gram was arbitrary and not implemented to remedy past discrimination.58
Therefore, O'Connor concluded that this program in no way met the re-
quirement in the strict scrutiny analysis that the means be narrowly
tailored.
In another major Supreme Court case, the legislature implemented an
affirmative action policy that drew voting-district boundary lines in an
extremely irregular manner. 59 One of the black voting districts had the
appearance of a snake: it was 160 miles long and extremely narrow.60
The complaint alleged that the effect of the method for determining vot-
ing districts was that two districts were created with a majority of black
voters. Therefore, the election of two African-Americans to Congress
was virtually guaranteed. 61 Again, the majority applied strict scrutiny to
the redistricting plan because it classified citizens on the basis of race and
found it unconstitutional.62 The Court recognized that proving "racial
gerrymandering" is difficult, but they refused to apply lesser scrutiny to a
plan that allowed district lines to be drawn in such a manner. 63
54. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
55. Id. at 469. Without even considering the opinion in the case, this plan is scary.
Basically, the plan told contractors whom they had to hire before they could receive a job.
This definitely sounds a lot like government overreaching into areas where it does not
belong.
56. Id. at 499. Basically, the Court found the imposition of a 30% quota completely
arbitrary and not "tied to any injury suffered by anyone." Id.
57. Id at 506.
58. Id.
59. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
60. Id. at 635-36.
61. Id at 637.
62. IM at 643, 649.
63. Id at 650.
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An important conclusion drawn from the discussion of these cases is
that the courts are going to always apply strict scrutiny to racial discrimi-
nation situations.64 With this strict scrutiny analysis in place, it seems that
programs with racial tinges will rarely be considered constitutional: the
application of strict scrutiny usually means the death of the program or
practice. 65 Our discussion now turns to some of the post-Bakke affirma-
tive action programs that have been implemented at graduate schools.
V. EXAMPLES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN
GRADUATE SCHOOLS
Until researching the different programs in place at graduate schools
around the nation, one might not realize the real hurdles that have been
placed in front of nonminority applicants to certain professional schools.
A quick glance at some statistics should make even the most outspoken
advocate of affirmative action programs realize that there are significant
inequities.
A recent look at UCLA Law School revealed some astounding
figures. 66 In 1993, more than 5200 candidates applied to UCLA for a
mere 350 spaces in the class.67 There were thirty applicants who were
rejected with an undergraduate grade point average (GPA) of 3.5 or bet-
ter and LSAT scores above the ninety-second percentile. 68 Such stan-
dards do not seem so unusual at a respected institution like UCLA. But
of these thirty people, twenty-seven were either white or failed to state
their race on the application form.69 Even more astonishing, the school
offered admission to twenty-two candidates, each having a GPA of less
than 3.0 and an LSAT score below the eightieth percentile. These admit-
tees consisted of thirteen African-Americans, six Latinos, and three Na-
tive Americans. 70 These statistics indicate that a minority with average
academic qualifications could be admitted, but nonminority applicants
with the same qualifications would not be admitted. The numbers would
64. The Supreme Court recently held that "all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995)(emphasis added). Before Adarand, the Court only subjected local and state race-based
legislation to strict scrutiny. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). After
Adarand, strict scrutiny is the proper standard to apply when dealing with race-based legis-
lation at any level of government. A previous case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990), applied intermediate scrutiny to "benign" federal racial classifications, but
it was overruled. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
65. The application of the strict scrutiny analysis resulted in "scrutiny that was 'strict'in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court-1971 Term, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972).
66. Allan J. Favish, Preferential Admissions at UCLA Law, L.A. DAILY NEws, Dec.
11, 1994, at V5 (discussing the faculty resistance the author encountered in obtaining statis-
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not be so problematic if there was not such a large discrepancy. In to-
day's world, with such an intense competition to receive admission to
professional schools, it seems astonishing that anyone would be able to
attain admission with a GPA of less than 3.0, while at the same time an
applicant with a GPA above 3.5 and an LSAT score in the ninetieth per-
centile would be denied admission on the basis of the applicant's skin
color.
UCLA Law School is not the only school that engages in these prac-
tices. At Georgetown Law School, a law student discovered that whites
were severely discriminated against in the admissions process. 71 The me-
dian LSAT score for white applicants was forty-three, while the median
for black applicants was thirty-six.72 According to this law student, this
discrepancy resulted in a bifurcated student body at the law school.73
This bifurcated student body damages everyone because one of the bene-
fits of the law school learning process is the commingling of people from
all sorts of different social backgrounds. These discrepancies bring about
a loss of this principle of a legal education and further resentment among
the races.74
Not only is there resentment among the races, but there is also harm to
the minorities who are admitted to the law school. There is a certain
stigma attached to affirmative action, with people questioning the creden-
tials of the minorities who are allowed admission.75 In the competitive
atmosphere of a law school, there could be a small group of people who
feel that affirmative action has created an unfair advantage for the minor-
ities in law school. They will undoubtedly voice their opinions, and this
may cause the minority students to feel defensive. This could affect a
minority student's academic performance and, therefore, his or her suc-
cess at the law school.
VI. FEDERAL CASES ADDRESSING ADMISSIONS POLICIES
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has not squarely ad-
dressed the issue of preferential admissions since the Bakke decision.
But the Court was concerned with the issue in a pre-Bakke case dealing
71. Lino A. Graglia, Race Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97,
97 (1992).
72. Id. at 100. The median LSAT scores for blacks and whites at U.T. Law School
showed similar discrepancies; the median LSAT score for whites was about 42, while the
median LSAT score for blacks was 33. Id.
73. Id. ("The result of race norming in law school admissions is to produce an entering
class with two separate student bodies, identifiable by race, essentially in different aca-
demic ballparks.").
74. See Albert Yates, Beyond the Numbers Game: Diversity Is Vital to True Education,
DENY. PosT, Jan. 2, 1996, at B5. Although affirmative action has allowed many people a
chance to acquire positions in parts of society, "affirmative action has contributed to polar-
ization and growing hostility among disparate groups." Id.
75. Donna St. George, Blacks Find Families at Odds in Affirmative Action Debate,
Hous. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1995, at All. The article discusses a minority who had been smart
throughout her life, but who was not respected in college because it was assumed that she
was there because she was black.
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with the University of Washington Law School.76 The petitioner,
DeFunis, applied to the law school and was denied admission; he brought
suit claiming racial discrimination.77 The problem with this case is that
the per curiam opinion does not address the issue of reverse discrimina-
tion. The Court considered the case moot because injunctive relief had
been granted to the petitioner; he was already in his third year of law
school and was set to graduate. 78 The Court felt that its Article III pow-
ers did not provide jurisdiction for this matter.79 But even though the
majority opinion failed to discuss reverse discrimination, the dissent un-
derstood the importance of the matter and provided an insightful
analysis.80
Justice Douglas discussed the admissions procedure and noted that, as
in most of these controversial cases, minority applications were evaluated
in a completely different manner than nonminority applicants.81 Under
the separate procedure, thirty-seven minorities were admitted, with all
but one having a lower index score82 than DeFunis.8 3 Douglas concluded
that the number of places for which DeFunis could possibly compete was
reduced simply because he was not a minority.84 Because of the impor-
tance of the issue, the dissent felt that a new trial was necessary to deter-
mine whether the Equal Protection Clause had been violated.8 5 The
majority's per curiam opinion, on the other hand, represented the
Supreme Court's earlier "stay away" attitude regarding programs like the
one in place at the University of Washington.8 6
In some of the post-Bakke federal cases, the candidates were unable to
prove that they would have been admitted absent the discriminatory pro-
grams.87 This problem may explain why more of these cases have not
76. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
77. Id. at 314.
78. Id. at 317 (DeFunis was already registered for his final term and was set to receive
his degree no matter what the Court decided; everyone agreed that he was going to be
allowed to complete his legal education at Washington).
79. Id at 316 ("[T]he exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case
or controversy.").
80. Id at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 323. The minority applications were compared with each other, but "were
never directly compared to the remaining applications." Id. Also, no matter what their
averages, the minority applications were never considered for summary rejection. Id.
82. The index was called the Predicted First Year Average and was calculated using
the LSAT and the applicant's grades in his final two years in college. Id, at 321.
83. Id. at 324.
84. Id. at 333.
85. Id. at 344.
86. Another case representing this "hands off" approach was Henson v. University of
Ark., 519 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1975). In this case, minority students were allowed an extra
chance at being admitted. If they were not admitted under the normal standards, then they
could be admitted if the admissions committee felt that the candidate had a "reasonable
likelihood" of success in law school. Id at 577. The case was dismissed because the court
apparently thought that there was no evidence that the minority admissions policies kept
the plaintiff out of the law school. Id. at 578.
87. See McAdams v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 508 F. Supp. 354, 360 (D. Minn.
1981) (little evidence that plaintiff would have been admitted without the questionable
admissions procedure which involved giving educationally and culturally disadvantaged
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been brought. With so many different factors being considered in the
admissions process, it is no wonder that many potential plaintiffs fail to
bring lawsuits. Schools can always mask reverse discrimination by using a
large number of admissions factors, making it virtually impossible for a
plaintiff to prove a claim. Although few cases have been successful at
challenging the admissions policies in graduate schools, some recent cases
have begun to show the courts' growing reluctance to approve preferen-
tial policies for minorities.
Last year, the Supreme Court refused to strike down a Fourth Circuit
decision which held that a scholarship program reserved only for black
students at the University of Maryland was unconstitutional.88 In this
case, Daniel Podberesky sued the University of Maryland over the Ban-
neker scholarship program, a merit-based scholarship program reserved
only for blacks.89 The university claimed that the program was necessary
to counter the present effects of past discrimination.90 In its view, there
were present effects of past discrimination because the school had a bad
reputation among the black community, blacks were underrepresented in
the student body, blacks who were admitted to the school had low gradu-
ation rates, and the atmosphere at Maryland was considered to be hostile
to blacks. 91
The court did not allow the program to be sustained based on the
school's poor reputation among the black community, which stemmed
from memories of the past discrimination. 92 The court stated that "mere
knowledge of historical fact is not the kind of present effect that can jus-
tify a race-exclusive remedy. '93 The court likewise could not justify the
program with the hostile-climate idea.94 The argument that racial atti-
tudes were carried along by black and white students for twenty-five
years failed because its success would have permitted a race-conscious
remedy to deal with societal discrimination. 95 The court also could not
justify the program because of low graduation rates or underrepresenta-
tion of minorities. There was not enough evidence supporting the idea
that black students leave, do not graduate, or are underrepresented at
Maryland because of past discrimination. 96
candidates who did not meet the normal requirements another chance at admission);
Baker v. Board of Regents of Kan., 721 F. Supp. 270, 277 (D. Kan. 1989) (rejected medical
school candidate could not prove that the rejection of his application was due to race when
it was apparent that it was due to his interviews, which were not found to be discriminatory
against whites).
88. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001
(1995).
89. Id. at 152.
90. Id. at 153.
91. Id. at 152.
92. Id. at 154.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 154-55.
95. Id. at 155 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)).
96. Id. at 156-57.
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The court then hedged its reasoning by holding that the Banneker
program was not narrowly tailored enough to remedy the possible gradu-
ation rate and underrepresentation problems.97 The Fourth Circuit
frowned on the district court's findings that the purpose of the scholar-
ship program was to recruit high-achieving blacks because high-achievers
were not the group that had been discriminated against in the past. 98
Also, the scholarship program was open to nonresidents of Maryland,
which would not address the school's concern that there were not enough
"qualified African-American Maryland residents" at the state
university.99
The court also found that the conditions for the program's continued
existence were based on arbitrary statistics.100 The university was unable
to provide a method to accurately determine how many African-Ameri-
can students must be at Maryland before the need for the affirmative
action scholarship program had passed. 10 Like in Croson,0 2 the Fourth
Circuit frowned on the use of calculations that had no real scientific basis.
Because of the court's decision in this case, scholarship programs around
the country, like the Banneker program, are likely to be changed. 10 3
Even more recently, a case emerged from Texas that laid the groundwork
for another bitter debate on the propriety of preferential admissions poli-
cies.' 04 Our discussion now turns to this important case.
VII. HOPWOOD V. TEXAS 10 5
A. INTRODUCTION
The Hopwood case brought the issue of preferential admissions in
graduate school out into the forefront yet again. The facts of the case are
familiar. One white female and three white males brought an action chal-
lenging the admissions policies at the University of Texas (U.T.) Law
School. They claimed that the law school was engaged in what was effec-
tively a quota system,106 which Bakke disallowed.' 0 7 The plaintiffs al-
97. Id at 157-58.
98. Id at 158.
99. Id. at 159.
100. Id. at 160. Apparently, the lower court was going to allow the Banneker program
to continue to exist until the amount of black students at the University of Maryland was
an accurate reflection of the amount of Maryland high school graduates who could possibly
attend the school. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
103. Colorado has already reconsidered its race-based scholarship programs and has
decided to allow preferences based upon class or need, not race. The Attorney General of
Colorado claimed that by assisting the needy, the minorities will probably be benefited
anyway. James Brooke, Colorado Tries College Aid Based on Need, Not on Race, N.Y.
TiMs, Jan. 16, 1996, at A10.
104. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to hear this case. Texas v. Hopwood,
116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
105. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
106. Id. at 553.
107. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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leged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and requested injunctive
and declaratory relief, in addition to compensatory and punitive
damages. 08
The challenged admissions procedure involved the use of a procedure
by which each class would consist of approximately five percent black
students and ten percent Mexican-American students.10 9 These numbers
were not arbitrary, but corresponded to the percentages of minority col-
lege graduates in Texas." 0 Like most states, Texas had a history of dis-
crimination against minorities in the educational arena."'
Discrimination at the university had continued into the 1950s and 1960s
with such policies as the requirement of separate minority living facilities
and the prohibition of black visitors to the white student dormitories. 1 2
Beginning in the 1970s, the university felt pressure from the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to con-
form to the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13 To
this date, the OCR is continuing to monitor U.T. to make sure that any
remnants of segregation are eliminated." 4 In order to comply with the
federal mandates, U.T. implemented the disputed admissions policy." 5
B. THE PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS POLICY AT U.T. LAW SCHOOL
In the 1970s, because there were few minorities in the law school, a
separate admissions committee was formed that examined the applica-
tions of minorities and other disadvantaged students. This committee had
no concrete requirements for admission, but was only concerned with the
prospective applicant's chances of passing the first year of law school.116
The problem with this system was that minority and nonminority students
were being evaluated separately." 7 The committee technically was or-
ganized to evaluate the applications of all disadvantaged students. But an
examination of the admissions that resulted from the committee's recom-
mendations reveals that the main concern was admitting minority stu-
dents.1 8 Because of the decision in Bakke, the law school felt that it
needed to reevaluate its admissions procedures, and it tried to abolish its
108. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553.
109. Id. at 560.
110. Id. at 560 n.19.
111. Texas had involved itself in a vigorous fight to attempt to stop integration of the
public education system. Id. at 554-55; see Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (separate
law school for blacks was unsatisfactory and a black man was forcibly admitted to U.T.
Law School).
112. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in pro-
grams receiving federal financial assistance).
114. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 557.
115. Id. at 556.
116. Id at 558.
117. Id.
118. For example, in 1977, 500 applications were considered by this separate committee,
100 of which were nonminorities. Sixty-eight minority students were admitted from this
pool, while only three nonminority students were admitted. Clearly, the primary purpose
of the committee was to increase minority enrollment. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 558.
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two separate evaluation committees. 119
Over the next few years, various admissions policies were imple-
mented-all of which possessed affirmative action characteristics. 120 By
1992, because of problems that resulted from a huge amount of applica-
tions, the application process involved a regular committee and a minor-
ity subcommittee. 121
The problems of this admissions procedure were obvious to the district
court. As soon as an application was received, it was color-coded par-
tially on the basis of race or ethnicity.' 22 There were three zones that
applicants fell into: the presumptive admission zone; the discretionary
zone; and the presumptive denial zone. 23
The presumptive admission and denial applications were preliminarily
analyzed, and some applications were put into the discretionary category
depending on a number of factors.' 24 To help the efficiency of the admis-
sion process, those in the presumptive admission or denial zones were
allowed admission or rejected simply on the basis of their grades and
LSAT scores.' 25 Observing the figures required for an applicant to be
placed in the different zones, one begins to notice the major problems
with the procedure.
The school set separate presumptive admission scores for nonminori-
ties, African-Americans, and Mexican-Americans. 126 But the striking
thing is that nonminorities had a higher presumptive denial score than the
presumptive admission score for minorities. 127 Basically, this meant that
white applicants who might possess numbers that would allow them to be
admitted automatically if they were black or Hispanic were thrown into
the discretionary zone on no other basis than their race.
The admissions procedure then separated minority and nonminority
applications in the discretionary zone. Three people on the admissions
committee evaluated nonminority students in groups of thirty. Each
119. Id. at 558-59.
120. For example, in the late 1970s, the law school used a banded admissions procedure.
Each of the bands (there were either five or six) were composed of students with similar
credentials. A percentage of individuals were admitted from each band; the higher bands(the ones with the students with the best credentials) were allocated a much higher per-
centage. Minority and nonminority candidates within each band were divided into sepa-
rate groups, which were then reviewed by individual members of the admissions
committee. Each member was able to decide the amount of affirmative action that was to
occur within his or her small group. Therefore, nonminorities could be severely affected by
affirmative action, depending on whether they were lucky enough to be included in one
group or another. Id. at 559.
121. Id. at 560.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 561.
124. Sometimes applicants had really achieved high grades, but they did so at a less
reputable university or in a less challenging major. Also, some applicants with lower
grades may have attended school at a quality university, or there were other characteristics
of their application that showed that they really had a better chance of succeeding in law
school. Id.
125. Id. at 560-61.
126. Id at 561-62.
127. Id at 562.
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committee member was given a "fixed number of votes determined by
the yield desired from a particular [group]."' 28 An applicant receiving no
votes or only one vote was denied admission or placed on the waiting list.
Applicants with two or three votes were admitted unless the chair of the
admissions committee, Professor Johanson, disagreed. 129 Minority appli-
cants were evaluated by a separate minority subcommittee, which had a
group discussion about each minority candidate. 130 Also, not everyone
on the minority subcommittee participated in a review of nonminority
files.13 1 The evidence further showed that all decisions of the minority
subcommittee were final.' 32 The result of these separate admissions poli-
cies for minorities is not astonishing. The average undergraduate GPA
and LSAT score for minorities was significantly lower than that of
nonminorities. 133
C. THE DECISION
The district court that decided Hopwood began its opinion by stressing
that these cases are subject to strict scrutiny. 34 This point is important
because the defendants relied on a somewhat recent court opinion to try
to persuade the court to adopt an intermediate standard of review. 135
The court distinguished this situation because the programs at U.T. were
not adopted as a response to a federal mandate. The programs were im-
plemented voluntarily after suggestions had been made by a federal
agency.' 36 The court further justified its use of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review by stressing the importance of the protection of individual
rights: "individual rights are afforded the full protection they merit under
the Constitution.' 37 The court noted that in some instances affirmative
action programs are valid when they are in place to remedy specific past
instances of discrimination; but when the programs do not and their im-
plementation affects innocent nonminorities, their continued existence
cannot be justified.138
Although much emphasis was placed on the importance of the contin-
ued application of the strict scrutiny test in this context, the district court
128. Id. at 559.
129. Id. at 562.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 563. T
133. Nonminorities had an average undergraduate GPA of 3.56 and average LSAT
score of 164; African-Americans had corresponding numbers of 3.30 and 158; and Hispan-
ics had an average undergraduate GPA of 3.24 and LSAT of 157. Id. at 563 n.32.
134. Id. at 568 (reaffirming the long-standing concept that racial classifications are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny).
135. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (adopting an intermediate
level of scrutiny in the case of affirmative action programs implemented in response to a
federal mandate). But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995)(holding that all racial classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny).
136. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 568-69.
137. Id. at 569.
138. Id.
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still held that the test was satisfied. The court held that "obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse stu-
dent body remains a sufficiently compelling interest to support the use of
racial classifications."'1 39 Although this intangible goal may be difficult to
measure, the evidence is rather substantial that a successful law school
must be one where students with diverse backgrounds are present. Di-
versity will better facilitate the exchange of a broad range of ideas.140 In
the university's view, there would have been very few Mexican-Ameri-
cans or African-Americans in the entering class of 1992 without the pref-
erential admissions program at U.T.141
The district court continued its analysis regarding the goals of the law
school's preferential admissions policies. The court held that U.T.'s pro-
grams survived strict scrutiny analysis because they satisfied the compel-
ling goal of remedying the effects of past discrimination.142 Apparently,
"the legacy of the past has left residual effects that persist into the
present."143
District Judge Sparks makes a valid point that the minorities affected
by the programs today are likely the children of parents who were denied
many educational opportunities in the past. This denial of educational
opportunities, according to Sparks, makes it much more difficult for their
children to succeed in school. 144 Furthermore, Sparks contends that the
candidates in law school in 1992 were likely to have been victims of the
racial segregation of the public school system in the 1970s and 1980s.
This segregation stunted their academic potential and probably caused
fewer minorities to achieve the necessary GPA and LSAT scores to be
admitted under normal admissions guidelines. 145 All of these arguments
put together show that the preferential admissions policy at U.T. Law
School was in pursuit of a compelling state objective.
But, under the strict scrutiny analysis, the means must be narrowly tai-
lored in pursuit of the objectives. In order to determine whether the
means employed are sufficiently tailored, the court considered four fac-
tors: (1) the possible presence of alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility
139. Id. at 570-71.
140. Id.
141. Only 9 blacks and 18 Mexican-Americans would have been admitted if applica-
tions had been evaluated on the numbers alone. Id.
142. Id. at 572. The continuing analysis suggests that the court may not have felt too
strongly about its conclusion that having a diverse student body is a sufficiently compelling
goal. If having a diverse student body was so compelling, the analysis should have stopped
here.
143. Id. Judge Sparks looked to the fact that the State of Texas and U.T. have had a
continuing history of discrimination in education. Texas resisted the integration of its
schools, and numerous racially motivated incidents have occurred on campus. Also, Texas
has had difficulty attracting minorities to its university because of the school's antiminority
reputation among their communities.
144. Id. at 572-73.
145. Id. at 573. This analysis by Sparks does a good job of countering the idea that
effects of past discrimination no longer exist today. This argument is one of the main
thrusts of the anti-affirmative action groups.
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and duration of the relief; (3) whether the goals related to the percentage
of minorities in the population; and (4) the effect of the goals on third
parties.146 The preferential admissions policy was attacked by the plain-
tiffs as the type of quota system that was disallowed in Bakke.'47 Even
though it was discovered that U.T. had certain enrollment percentage
goals, the goals were not stringently pursued. The U.T. policy was far
from the blatant, concrete numerical goals that were present in Bakke.148
Sparks brushed aside the next two factors and found them satisfied by
the admissions policies. He was more troubled, however, by the possibil-
ity that innocent parties were adversely affected by the U.T. program.' 49
The school was basically penalizing people in their early to mid-twenties
for horrible acts that occurred either before they were born or before
they were old enough to affect a discriminatory society.'50
One adverse effect on the nonminorities was that many were rejected
earlier in the admissions process, without being compared with the mi-
nority students' files.' 51 The district court frowned upon the fact that mi-
norities had a separate admissions procedure from nonminorities. But
the court was even more critical of the different presumptive denial crite-
ria established for the different groups.152 Even worse, according to
Sparks, is that no minority student who was below the presumptive denial
line was summarily denied admission. In 1992, all minority applicants
who were not presumptively admitted were placed in the discretionary
zone, and none were summarily denied admission.' 53 This observation
further illustrates the lack of fairness in U.T.'s admissions scheme. In
1992, the U.T. Law School admissions office established certain rules gov-
erning admissions. But minority applicants were exempt from these
rules. The university attempted to defend its policies by pointing to other
146. Id.
147. Id. at 570-71; see generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
148. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 574. The admission percentages for minorities from
1983 to 1993 varied significantly. Sometimes an entering class was more than 10% Mexi-
can-American, sometimes the percentage was less. The same is true for the enrollment
figures for African-Americans. The district court seemed to stress the fact that specific
numbers were not used, like in Bakke. This suggests that if the percentage goals were
followed more strictly, they would have been considered quotas. Id.
149. Id. at 575. Sparks was impressed that the percentage goals related to percentages
of Hispanic and black college graduates in the state. Things might be different in other
cases if percentages were arrived at in an arbitrary manner. Id.
150. The statement is based on the presumption that a large number of applicants to
law schools are either coming directly from college or have graduated from college in the
last few years. Assuming that they arrived at college at age 18 and graduated at age 22 or
23, they would be applying to law school between the ages of 22 and 25. This statement
does not discount the fact that a large number of applicants are much older than 22 or 25.
151. A perfect example of the early rejections of nonminority applicants is that by the
end of February 1992, 201 resident candidates for admission had been denied, not one of
which was Mexican or African-American. Id.
152. Because of the inconsistent application of the presumptive denial policy, certain
nonminority students were rejected early on in the process even though minority students
with similar scores were not presumptively denied admission. Id. at 576.
153. itk
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schools around the country and demonstrating the use of similar admis-
sions practices. 154 But the district court was unimpressed and did not al-
low other schools' policies to influence the decision.' 55
Sparks felt that U.T. was required to allow the most qualified candi-
dates in the state a chance at a high quality legal education.' 56 By using
separate admissions procedures for minorities and nonminorities, this re-
quirement was not attainable.' 57 In its decision, the district court af-
firmed the idea that race could be lawfully used as a "plus" factor in the
admissions process.'5 8 But the main problem with U.T.'s admissions pro-
cedures was that there was no comparison between the two groups. The
best minority candidates were admitted, consistent with the percentage
goals of U.T., without regard to how these students stacked up against the
nonminority students. Thus, it was possible that a student's skin color,
rather than qualifications, decided whether or not that student gained ad-
mission to one of the best law schools in the country.' 59 The fact that the
rights of third parties were adversely affected caused the district court to
find that this admissions procedure was not narrowly tailored and, thus,
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 160
As a result, one might think that all of the plaintiffs walked away ec-
static with the verdict and that the district court had forced U.T. Law
School to admit all four plaintiffs, as occurred in Bakke.16' But that is not
the case.
The court, after finding the constitutional violation, next looked to
whether "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons" existed for refusing to
admit the four plaintiffs.' 62 The court examined the statistics of each
plaintiff and decided that it was possible that they would not have been
admitted, even if a constitutional admissions process had been in place.' 63
Although Sparks noted that the plaintiffs' indices were higher than most
of the minorities who were offered admission, he did not say that these
154. Id.; see also Terrence Stutz, UT Minority Enrollment Tested by Suit, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, Oct. 14, 1995, at Al (asserting that trial testimony indicated that schools
like Stanford and Michigan had similar programs).
155. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 577 ("The fact that other schools may use processes with
similar components does not resolve the issue of whether the defendants deprived the four
plaintiffs ... of equal protection under the law.").
156. Id. at 578.
157. Id.
158. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316.
159. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 578 ("[ajdmission of the best qualified was not assured
in 1992").
160. Id. at 579.
161. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
162. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 579-80.
163. The court did note a fairly large difference in the index scores of minority and
nonminority candidates. The highest nonminority index was 220, while the highest Afri-
can-American index was 199 and the highest Mexican-American index was 208. Ten
nonminorities who had indices higher than Hopwood were not offered admission. Three
of the plaintiffs had indices of 197, but there were 16 other nonminority applicants who
were denied admission with this same index. Also, although minorities possessed the low-
est indices of admittees, the lowest nonminority index was only slightly higher. Id. at 580-
81.
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candidates should have been offered admission.164 The district court felt
that, after analyzing the files of the four plaintiffs, their application mater-
ials were not glaringly superior to the minority candidates that were ad-
mitted. 165 These findings led to a rather unsatisfying result for the
plaintiffs: declaratory relief.
D. THE RESULT
The end result of the Hopwood case, in the district court, was that the
plaintiffs received declaratory relief. The court acknowledged that the
method by which the law school admitted students was unconstitu-
tional.1' But the court refused to grant injunctive relief or mandate a
change in the admissions procedures because the university had already
made, or was in the process of making, the necessary changes in the ad-
missions procedures.167 Basically, the plaintiffs each received a chance to
reapply to U.T. in 1995 without charge and nominal damages of one
dollar.16
VIII. THE AFTERMATH OF THE DISTRICT
COURT'S DECISION
An extensive analysis of the case reveals that the opponents of affirma-
tive action admissions policies should be happy with it. The decision
forced one of the best law schools in the country to give every applicant a
greater opportunity for admission. But reaction to the case suggests
otherwise. A group of lawyers from the Center for Individual Rights,
which represented the plaintiffs, were displeased with the result. They
felt that such a small award would have little, if any, effect on most law
school admissions policies across the country. They were concerned that
the low award would send a message to law schools that they need not
worry about their preferential admissions policies. Most people affected
by the policies are not likely to spend the time and money to challenge a
university if they will not win more than one dollar. 69 This verdict seems
164. Id. at 581-82.
165. Id. at 581 (court refused to put itself in the shoes of the admissions committee who
had much better knowledge of the admissions process).
166. Id. at 582.
167. The law school has made numerous changes since the suit was filed against them.
These changes went into effect on September 1, 1994. Now, applications of minorities are
not sent to a special subcommittee for evaluation. Applicants are no longer placed into the
presumptive admit, discretionary, or presumptive denial zones. Candidates with the top
GPAs and LSAT scores will be admitted quickly just like always, but among students with
lower scores, there is a much greater emphasis on undergraduate institution, work experi-
ence, and the like. Race is still considered, but hopefully it is just being considered as a
"plus" factor. Janet Elliott, UT Responds to Suit with Policy Changes, TEX. LAW., May 23,
1994, at 10. But see Henry J. Reske, $1 Damages for Reverse Bias Plaintiffs, 80 A.B.A. J.
24 (1994) (plaintiff's lawyer in Hopwood claims that the new policy is simply "window
dressing" and is not satisfactory even if it sets goals for minority admissions).
168. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 583.
169. See Verbatim: Hopwood: "A Perfect Mess of an Opinion," TEX. LAW., Nov. 7,
1994, at 34 (excerpt from a Center for Individual Rights publication).
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even more ridiculous when one considers other civil rights cases where
high damages were awarded or settlements were made for relatively mi-
nor incidents. 170 Michael McDonald, one of the plaintiffs' lawyers, did
express some happiness because since Bakke, no court had struck down
university admissions procedures as unconstitutional on the basis of re-
verse discrimination. But he felt wronged because his clients were not
awarded meaningful damages and did not receive injunctive relief.17'
Another concern that came out of this decision was that the court re-
quired the plaintiffs to prove that they would have been admitted without
the unconstitutional admissions policies. This burden, in many eyes, is
virtually impossible. With so many factors being taken into account by an
admissions committee (grades, test scores, letters of recommendation,
work experience, educational background, and the like), it is hard to be-
lieve that any plaintiff could ever prove that he or she would have been
admitted absent the unconstitutional procedures. "[T]o assign this bur-
den of proof is to deny the relief, for no plaintiff can possibly prove that
he would have emerged victorious from the lottery among the discretion-
ary admit(tee)s.' 72
This ruling was embraced by affirmative action supporters. Some
viewed the district court decision as a "straightforward endorsement of
the use of race in admissions to law schools."'1 73 The opinion reaffirmed
the basic rule in Bakke that race may still be used as a factor in student
admissions. 74 The importance of the decision lay in the federal courts'
willingness, after fifteen years, to allow race to be a valid consideration,
even though affirmative action programs have been under attack in re-
cent years.
IX. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
In March of 1996, the Fifth Circuit addressed the case on appeal. The
circuit court decided that affirmative action programs have no place in
school admissions.' 75 The decision "outlawed consideration of race as
any factor at all" in admissions decisions. 176 Circuit Judge Smith, deliver-
ing the court's opinion, affirmed the basic principle that courts must em-
170. These seemingly minor incidents include the settlement of a class action against
Denny's Restaurants for $17.7 million for allegedly serving people ten minutes late. Also,
there was the case of a newspaper advertisement which only had white models. Just be-
cause an African-American man was upset by this ad, the jury awarded the man $800,000.
Id These awards are probably better applied to a law review article on the absurdity of
certain tort awards, but in this context they do make one wonder why these awards and
settlements were garnered by minority plaintiffs and why white plaintiffs, in a seemingly
more sensitive situation, were awarded only a dollar each.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Reske, supra note 167, at 24.
174. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 578.
175. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
176. Anthony Lewis, Should Race Be a Consideration in College Admissions?, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 31, 1996, at J5.
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ploy strict scrutiny when evaluating any racial classification.' 77
The opinion begins with a detailed analysis of Justice Powell's opinion
in Bakke.178 Circuit Judge Smith concentrates on Powell's analysis of the
possible justifications for using racial preferences in admissions policies.
Justice Powell thought that "remedying societal discrimination and pro-
viding role models" were never proper justifications for racial preferences
in admission policies.179 But Powell did believe that diversity was a "con-
stitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education."'180
The Fifth Circuit looked at the situation differently, finding that consid-
ering race is never appropriate when it is done for the purpose of having
a diverse student body.' 8 ' In so doing, the court stated that Powell's be-
lief was only supported by one vote and "has never represented the view
of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case." 82 The court
avoided interpreting its decision as being contrary to Bakke by observing
that the diversity rationale was never supported by a Bakke majority and
that the word diversity only appeared in Powell's opinion. 83 Also, Cir-
cuit Judge Smith noted that not one case since the Bakke decision has
held that diversity was a "compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny
analysis."' 84 After analyzing later Supreme Court cases, the court was of
the opinion that remedying past discrimination was the only goal that
justified a use of racial preferences. 85
The court noted other problems that occur when race is taken into ac-
count in ways like those occurring at U.T.186 Racial hostility often oc-
curs, as well as bigotry. By using diversity as a goal, minorities are
lumped together into a group, under the assumption that they think the
same. 87 Thus, the court overruled the district court's acceptance of the
diversity rationale.188
After denouncing the diversity rationale, Smith examined the district
court's acceptance of the remedial purpose to justify racial preferences.
Once again, the court explained that remedying societal discrimination
was not a proper justification for affirmative action 189 and chastised the
district court for allowing "the remedial justification to reach all public
177. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940.
178. Id. at 941-44.
179. Id. at 942 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
180. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.





186. Id. at 945-64.
187. Id. at 946 ("To believe that a person's race controls his point of view is to stereo-
type him.").
188. Id. at 948.
189. Id. at 950.
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education within the State of Texas."'190 If the remedial purpose was ex-
panded and applied to the entire state, it could also be used to justify
preferences in any state operation that considers an applicant's educa-
tional achievements. 191 Thus, preferences could be justified in an unlim-
ited number of areas. To avoid this, the court restricted its evaluation to
the U.T. Law School to determine if the school's racial preferences were
justified by past discrimination. 192 Just because past discrimination ex-
isted in the U.T. system as a whole did not mean that U.T. Law School
itself discriminated. Such past discrimination, therefore, could not justify
an affirmative action admissions policy. 193
When it considered only the past policies of the law school, the court
determined that no compelling interest in correcting the present conse-
quences of past discrimination had been shown to justify affirmative ac-
tion admissions policies.' 94 The defendants argued that the hostile
environment at U.T. Law School, the school's reputation in the minority
community, and the underrepresentation of minorities at the school were
present effects of past discrimination. 195 But the court, citing Podberesky
v. Kirwan,196 rejected the idea that the school's reputation and the al-
leged hostile environment could justify the admissions procedures. 197
The court also could not find evidence that the underrepresentation was
due to any discriminatory policies at the law school.198 Since there was
no evidence that effects of discrimination by the law school in the past are
still felt today, the underrepresentation justification did not help the de-
fendants. As a result, because the law school did not show a compelling
interest to remedy the "present effects of past discrimination," the court
never considered whether the program was narrowly tailored. The circuit
court, like the district court, found the admissions program
unconstitutional. 199
Aside from the significant determination that race cannot be used at all
in admissions decisions, the court also made an important finding on the
burden of proof in these situations. As discussed earlier, a huge problem
for reverse discrimination plaintiffs has been that the burden of proof as
to damages has been on the plaintiffs instead of the defendants. 200 Smith
relied on a previous case, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Edu-
190. Id. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has warned that the use of racial remedies
must be carefully limited, and a remedy reaching all education within a state addresses a
putative injury that is vague and amorphous." Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 951-52.
193. Id. at 951. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the "specific [state] agency involved is
best able to measure the harm of its past discrimination" and, thus, "the law school[ ] is the
appropriate governmental unit for measuring a constitutional remedy." Id.
194. Id. at 955.
195. Id. at 952.
196. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
197. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-53.
198. Id. at 954.
199. Id. at 955.
200. See supra text accompanying note 172.
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cation v. Doyle,20 1 to shift the burden to the law school.
In Mt. Healthy, the Court gave the school the burden of proving that an
improperly discharged teacher would have been terminated anyway.20 2
By shifting the burden, plaintiffs in these cases are not handcuffed by the
almost impossible task of proving that they would have been admitted
without the policy. Now the schools must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the plaintiffs would not have been admitted under
proper admissions policies. 203
As a result of this determination in Mt. Healthy, the Fifth Circuit di-
rected the district court to reconsider Hopwood to see if the school could
show that these plaintiffs would not have been admitted anyway.2°4 If the
school could not prove this, the district court was directed to award any
relief it believed was proper.205
Interestingly enough, the court refused to grant any prospective injunc-
tive relief.20 6 The district court gave the plaintiffs the right to reapply to
U.T.20 7 But the court felt that it was not necessary to enter an injunction
because it was "confident that the conscientious administration at the
school. .. will heed the directives contained in this opinion.' '208
Finally, the court addressed punitive damages. The court felt that the
law school had acted in good faith; thus, the refusal by the district court
to award punitives was proper.209 But the Fifth Circuit warned that the
continued use of racial classifications could justify an award of punitive
damages in the future. 210
A. REACTION TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
The decision understandably elicited quick reaction. Some see this de-
cision as possibly ending affirmative action as it exists today.211 Others
worry that the decision could resegregate higher education. Apparently,
if race would not have been considered in admissions decisions in 1992,
only nine blacks and eighteen Hispanics would have been admitted.212
But we cannot continue to allow students, regardless of their race, to
achieve admission into a law school like U.T. without having the requisite
qualifications. Through its system, U.T. has given an unfair advantage to
201. 429 U.S. 274 (1977), cited in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 956-57.
202. Id. at 287.
203. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 956-57. The Fifth Circuit even implied that schools should
not be unhappy with this burden shifting because it "simply gives the defendant law school
a second chance of prevailing by showing that the violation was largely harmless." Id.
204. Id.
205. Id
206. Id. at 958.
207. Id.
208. Id
209. Id. at 959.
210. Id.
211. Linda P. Campbell, UT Law School Case Fuels Affirmative Action Opposition,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 24, 1996, at 5.
212. Terrence Stutz, Court Says UT Can't Show Bias, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar.
20, 1996, at Al, A17.
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many "children of wealthy and highly educated black or Hispanic fami-
lies" who had lower grades and test scores than "children of poor white
or native American families. '2 13
Resegregation will not happen if schools make early efforts to prepare
students to make high grades and test scores or if the schools make better
efforts to recruit minority students who can meet race-neutral admissions
standards. Yale has been able to recruit qualified minority students since
the early 1970s, so there is no doubt that other schools should be able to
do this in the 1990s.21 4
Even Texas Attorney General Dan Morales, whose office appealed the
decision, agrees that the objectives of diversity and inclusiveness should
not be put ahead of the Constitution or fairness concerns.21 5 Although
Morales believes that race should be one consideration in the admissions
process, he recognizes that "[w]e will never overcome past discrimination
by practicing discrimination today. ' 216 Morales appears to be taking an
objective approach, which other leaders reject. For example, Texas
NAACP president Gary Bledsoe has stated that "[i]t could take several
years for many of these folks to find another way of getting an educa-
tion."2 17 This may not be true. If one does not have the numbers or
other qualifications, one can apply to other schools. Not everyone can
receive admission to U.T., Harvard, or Yale. Not everyone gets into law
school, especially the law school of their choice. We cannot give certain
people an unfair advantage because of their race.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
On July 1, 1996, the Supreme Court declined to hear the Hopwood
case.21 8 In refusing to hear the case, Justices Ginsburg and Souter stated
that Texas was "challeng[ing] the rationale relied on by the Court of Ap-
peals" and that the Court "reviews judgments, not opinions. 2 19 The ad-
missions policy at U.T. in 1992 was no longer in controversy, and the
Court wanted to "await a final judgment on a program genuinely in con-
troversy before addressing" the affirmative action issue.220 The case now
proceeds back to U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks to determine the
amount of damages for the plaintiffs and the attorneys' fees. The trial
213. John Doggett, UT Can Find Qualified Minorities, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr.
8, 1996, at All.
214. Id.
215. Dan Morales, Use One Standard for Admission, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 4,
1996, at A13.
216. Id.
217. Terrence Stutz, UT Case May Have Big Impact, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 4,
1996, at Al.
218. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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date has been set for November 25, 1996.221
C. AFTERMATH
As a result of the Supreme Court's refusal to hear the case, thus al-
lowing the Fifth Circuit's decision to stand, U.T. and Texas A&M Univer-
sity ("A&M") announced massive changes in their admissions policies.
The U.T. system will cease the long-standing policy of admitting many
students automatically because of outstanding grades and test scores.222
The new policy will take into account indications of leadership, the appli-
cants' parents' educational background, and three essays,223 beginning in
the summer of 1997.224 U.T.'s new application form will not have any-
thing questioning the applicant about race. 225 A&M's new policies are
similar: leadership, personal characteristics, work experience, and over-
coming adversity will be more important in the admission decision.226
Many are concerned that the Hopwood decision will hurt U.T.'s
chances to compete with other major universities in minority student re-
cruitment.227 Attorney General Morales has interpreted the ruling to
mean that racial preferences cannot be used in the awarding of financial
aid, which may deter many minorities from enrolling.2 28 Because the rul-
ing only applies to the Fifth Circuit, it may put U.T. at a competitive
disadvantage.
It remains to be seen what effect the removal of affirmative action will
have in the Fifth Circuit states. Speculation has been that the U.T. Law
School student body could end up being all-white.229 But perhaps the
new admissions factors are such that a significant amount of minorities
will qualify for admission without the need for affirmative action pro-
grams. It will be interesting to observe this situation in the next few
years.
221. Jim Phillips, Damages, Lawyers' Fees Are Issues in UT Reverse-Discrimination
Case, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 7, 1996, at B2.
222. UT Regents Revise Admissions Policy, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1996, at A33.
223. Id.
224. New UT Policy's Wise, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 13, 1996, at A8.
225. Jim Phillips, Revamped Admissions Likely for UT; Regents Expected Today to Shift
Focus Away from Grades and Toward Essays, Activities, Background, AUSTIN AM.-STATES-
MAN, Aug. 8, 1996, at B1. But there will be a separate form that will ask an applicant about
his ethnicity or gender. It will include a disclaimer that the information will only be used
for statistical purposes. Id.
226. UT Regents Revise Admissions Policy, supra note 222, at A43.
227. Lesley Hensell, UT Faces Uncertain Future Without Affirmative Action, Hous.
CHRON., July 7, 1996, at D1.
228. Mary Ann Roser, Texas Hit Hard By Hopwood Decision, AuSTn AM.-STATES-
MAN, July 11, 1996, at B1. Officials in the other two states in the Fifth Circuit, Louisiana
and Mississippi, have not come to a definitive conclusion about whether the ruling also
covers financial aid. Id.
229. Hensell, supra note 227, at D1.
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X. ACTIONS BY THE U.C. BOARD OF REGENTS
A. OVERVIEW
Some other events have happened in California which could stop the
use of racial preferences in many areas, including higher education.
"'July 20 will live a long time in California history,' said Jesse Jackson.
230
This quote was in response to the cancellation by the U.C. Board of Re-
gents of all racially based preferences in hiring, contracting, and student
admissions. 231 The new policy will no longer allow "'race, religion, gen-
der, color, ethnicity, or national origin"' to be used as factors in admis-
sions decisions starting on January 1, 1997.232 This action has shocked
many because in the past California was one of the leaders in the imple-
mentation of affirmative action policies.
The whole movement to end preferential policies in California was
started by Ward Connerly, an African-American businessman. Connerly
wants to achieve diversity on college campuses without using these pref-
erential policies. 233 Connerly was appointed by Governor Pete Wilson.
Governor Wilson, a former candidate in the 1996 presidential race, has
expressed his disdain for these policies and has advocated the rights of
the individual over group rights.234 He claimed that he wanted the Cali-
fornia taxpayers, who pay for the operations of the universities in the
California university system, to have an equal chance at having their chil-
dren admitted to the state universities. He also wanted these policies
abolished because of the further racial division that they cause.235 We
now turn to the effects on the California university system.
From a statistical analysis, the number of minority students will proba-
bly decrease significantly when race is not taken into account as a factor
in the admissions decisions.236 Even more troubling for the university
may be the fact that, with the larger emphasis on economic criteria in the
admissions process, there may be significant funding problems because
lower income students generally receive a larger amount of financial
aid.237 Also, students may be admitted with lower grades and lower
LSAT scores, a problem which not only affects a university's reputation
230. Amy Wallace & Dave Lesher, UC Regents, In Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative
Action, L.A. TIMEs, July 21, 1995, at Al.
231. Id. The policies were cancelled at a 12-hour meeting of the regents at U.C.-San





236. Id. The figures show that by the addition of economic merit in the admissions
criteria and the subtraction of race, the amount of black students could fall as much as
50%. Blacks would then represent less than 3% of the student body. Also, Hispanic en-
rollment could fall from 13% to 11%. There would be a 15-25% rise in Asian-American
students and white enrollment would increase approximately 5%. Id.
237. Because of funding cuts, the university is already struggling as it is. Financial aid
programs, as they now stand, are not going to be enough. Id.
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around the country, but also led to the present controversy today.238 One
day many years from now, we may be debating the preferential admis-
sions policies for the economically disadvantaged, although it is doubtful
that any such admissions policies could elicit such a huge debate as the
affirmative action policies have.
Another interesting feature of the California regents' decision is that
many in the California university system support continuing affirmative
action policies. 239 This continued widespread support caused the only
student regent at U.C., Edward Gomez, to initiate a challenge and a pro-
posal to reverse the decision. 240 Gomez claimed that his action was in
response to the urging of over 1800 faculty members. The plea was ex-
pected to be denied, but there were plans for professors in the system to
come together and eventually request a cancellation of the regents' deci-
sion.241 It remains to be seen whether these efforts by the student and
the faculty will be successful.
Another important aspect of the Board's actions is that this may be
only the first step in abolishing affirmative action programs in university
admissions policies242 or in any field across the country. The magnitude
of the regents' decision cannot be ignored.
B. REACrION
As a result of the U.C. Board of Regents' decision, supporters of af-
firmative action have unveiled a different method of assuring that minori-
ties are adequately represented at U.C.-Berkeley. The Berkeley Pledge,
as it is called, focuses on minority and low income public school stu-
dents.243 The Pledge involves efforts to identify elementary and high
school age students who could possibly attend Berkeley with some assist-
ance. The assistance includes summer programs, mentoring by profes-
sors,244 and heavy recruiting.245 A program like this will obviously cost a
238. Id.
239. U.C.'s president, vice presidents, student leaders, and faculty all want to keep the
programs because they believe the programs enhance the diversity on the college cam-
puses. Id.
240. Pamela Burdman, Challenge to Regents' Vote at UC, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 1996, at
A20. Gomez is a graduate student at U.C.-Riverside. Id.
241. Id. The faculty based their argument on the idea that hiring and admissions poli-
cies should be determined by them, not by the regents. Id. The faculty is claiming that, at
a minimum, the regents have "ignored a 70-year tradition of shared governance among
regents, administration, and faculty." Pamela Burdman, UC Officials Roll Out Plans on
Preferences, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 1995, at Al, A19.
242. Many public university systems are closely monitoring the situation in California.
The regents at the University of Maryland have continued to endorse affirmative action
policies, and the U.C. regents' actions might cause them to change their minds. Also, offi-
cials at the University of Arizona have decided to reassess their affirmative action policies
and could possibly decide to eliminate them. David Folkenflik, Affirmative Action Efforts
Questioned, BALT. SUN, Dec. 10, 1995, at 5.
243. See Tien's Alternative to Affirmative Action, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1996, at A14.
244. Id. Already, in San Francisco, 17 Nobel Laureates have been obtained to academi-
cally assist students in the San Francisco public schools. Id.
245. Id.
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great deal of money; U.C.-Berkeley Chancellor Chaing-Lin Tien has
committed $1 million a year for three years to the program, as well as
$10,000 of his own salary.246 The hope is that by implementing these pro-
grams, the students will become eligible for admission to the U.C.
system.247
In addition to the Berkeley Pledge, U.C. officials have come up with
new guidelines and factors to consider when evaluating a student's appli-
cation. The goal of the new guidelines is for the university to have a
diverse student body without using racial or gender preferences. There
will be no mention of race or gender, but the admissions committee will
be able to look at "a candidate's completion of special projects, outstand-
ing performance in a particular subject, as well as 'unusual persistence
and determination' in overcoming adverse circumstances" in the deci-
sion-making process.248
Southern Methodist University ("SMU") has had a program similar to
the Berkeley Pledge underway since 1991. The focal point of the Inner
Community Experience ("ICE") Program is a house in one of the lower
income neighborhoods of Dallas. SMU students who live at the house,
along with other students, are enrolled in a class that conducts a tutoring
program for the children in the neighborhood. 249 Programs similar to the
Berkeley Pledge and the ICE Program could be initiated around the
country to help improve the education of these disadvantaged students.
The theory is that by more effectively preparing elementary and middle
school students, the diversity issue will take care of itself; students will be
able to achieve the needed grades in high school and college so that they
will be admitted without the need for affirmative action programs.
The University of Pennsylvania ("Penn") is involved in heavy recruit-
ing of minority students.250 The school's activities could be a model for
any university to follow. Penn sends sixteen admissions officers across
the country to meet promising students at many inner-city high schools
and try to convince them that attendance at Penn is a possibility for them.
These efforts result in some students, who never thought that they could
attend a university like Penn, realizing the possibility of going to such an
elite school.251 Other schools could follow Penn's lead and aggressively
recruit minority students. The extensive effort to recruit these students
does not involve any political or social problems.
246. Nanette Asimov, UC Berkeley Is Taking the 'Pledge', S.F. CHRON., Dec. 25, 1995,
at Al.
247. Id.
248. Burdman, supra note 241, at A19. These new factors will likely result in a less
diverse group of students. A recently released report has indicated that the new admission
factors will only work to minimize the adverse consequences on diversity that the end of
affirmative action programs has caused. Wallace & Lesher, supra note 230, at Al.
249. Wes Magruder, Ordination Will Be Next Step in Woman's Lifetime of Service, DAL,
LAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 11, 1995, at G3.
250. Howard Goodman, Penn Displays Firm Belief in Affirmative Action, HARRISBURG
PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS, Nov. 8, 1995, at BI1.
251. Id.
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These alternatives to affirmative action should be implemented in
other areas of the country. They give disadvantaged minority students a
chance at going to a school like Berkeley or Penn without taking advan-
tage of a program like affirmative action.
XI. THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE 25 2
A. OVERVIEW
Following the U.C. regents' actions, a campaign began to stop all gov-
ernment-funded affirmative action programs in California with the so-
called California Civil Rights Initiative. This document, along with an
identical bill up for consideration by the California legislature would, for
all intents and purposes, end all government-funded affirmative action
programs for minorities and women. 25 3 One of the arguments of the ini-
tiative's proponents is that affirmative action programs tend to create
more racial hatred, something that we can certainly do without in today's
society. The author of the proposal, Bernie Richter, stated what prefer-
ential policies do to the attitudes of people: "'When you deny someone
who has earned it and give it to someone else who has not earned it...
you create anger and resentment .... You stir the flames of racial ha-
tred.' ' 254 This is a valid point, but even placing proposals like this before
the legislature or the public for a vote may cause racial hatred and
division.
California voters passed the initiative, commonly known as Proposition
209, by a margin of fifty-four percent to forty-six percent.255 About 8.7
million votes were cast, and the measure won by about 750,000 votes.256
This hardly ends the matter in California, however, because a lawsuit has
been filed in federal court by organizations led by the American Civil
Liberties Union, seeking to have the measure declared unconstitu-
tional.257 The first programs that are likely to be attacked under Proposi-
tion 209 include a California community college rule that requires race to
be used as a consideration in staff hiring and certain contract decisions by
252. The California Civil Rights Initiative states:
Neither the state of California nor any of its political subdivisions or agents
shall use race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as a criterion for either
discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual
or group in the operation of the state's system of public employment, public
education or public contracting.
Cathleen Decker, Affirmative Action: Fairness or Favoritism?, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1995,
at Al.
253. Id (The initiative would amend the state constitution and would be mainly con-
cerned with hiring and college admissions policies, but it may even prohibit voluntary de-
segregation policies in elementary schools).
254. Id
255. Dave Lesher, Battle Over Prop. 209 Moves to the Courts, L.A. TiMEs, Nov. 7, 1996,
at Al.




the California State Lottery Commission that involve race.258 The effects
of the voting results may not be felt for a while because many state offi-
cials have indicated that they do not intend to comply with Proposition
209 until a court decision is reached regarding its legality.259
B. EFFECr
The California Civil Rights Initiative does not exist in a vacuum. The
result of this effort to curb affirmative action in California will send shock
waves throughout the nation. In other states, opponents of preferential
programs will likely renew efforts to stop these programs which failed a
few months ago.260
Many of the public efforts underway to curb affirmative action pro-
grams have probably come about as a result of the failure of the individ-
ual state legislatures to adopt bills to cut these types of programs. 261
These state legislatures have taken the attitude that affirmative action
should be fixed, but not ended. 262
Louisiana Governor Mike Foster took another approach to end affirm-
ative action programs. 263 Foster has decided to do away with all affirma-
tive action programs in his state government. Also, Foster has said that
he will utilize executive order to eliminate those programs that are not
shielded by state or federal law.264 By doing this, Foster has taken a
political stand, but local minority politicians will likely oppose him in his
battle to curb these programs.265
C. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ATrTUDE
The California Civil Rights Initiative is only a tiny spark in the continu-
ally growing fire over affirmative action. The Republicans began to chal-
lenge affirmative action policies in 1980 when Ronald Reagan challenged
President Carter's affirmative action programs.266 In 1994, the Republi-
can party gained control of Congress, and many thought that affirmative
action programs for women and minorities would quickly disappear. 267
258. Lesher, supra note 255, at Al.
259. Id.
260. Denniston, supra note 256, at A6. Groups in over 20 states are preparing to try to
follow California's lead. Adam Pertman, Affirmative Action's Loss in Calif Expected to
Spur Similar Battles, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1996, at A34.
261. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Efforts to End Job Preference Are Faltering, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1995, at Al, B10. Bills to cut affirmative action programs have not made it
through the legislatures of at least 12 states including Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas,
and Washington. Id.
262. Id.




266. Neal Devins, Essay, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353, 354
(1989).
267. Ronald Brownstein, Blitz Stalls, But a Long War Looms, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 31,
1995, at Al.
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But Congress never passed legislation to cut the affirmative action
programs.2 68
Affirmative action was an issue in the 1996 presidential election cam-
paign. Republican nominee Bob Dole supported the elimination of pref-
erences as set forth by the California Civil Rights Initiative.2 69 Dole also
co-authored the Equal Opportunity Act, which would "prohibit[ ] the
federal government from granting any preference to any person.., based
in whole or in part on race, color, national origin or sex."'270 The act was
unsuccessful last year, but Republican Representative Charles Canady of
Florida, Dole's co-author of the Equal Opportunity Act, plans to re-offer
the act when Congress reconvenes. 271
The two parties see the issue of affirmative action from completely dif-
ferent viewpoints. The Republicans tend to view affirmative action pro-
grams as dividing the races and continuing racial prejudices in the
country; the Democrats view affirmative action programs as necessary to
correct the continuing and worsening problem of discrimination in soci-
ety.272 Both parties are correct in their assessment of the issue. Clearly,
any type of program that handicaps one race in favor of another will facil-
itate hostility among races. Thus, we must ask ourselves if there will ever
be a time when these policies are no longer needed; there will always be
an argument that discrimination is present in society. Therefore, affirma-
tive action policies could always be justified on these grounds. But at
some point, people must realize that affirmative action policies merely
continue the antagonism among the races and do not allow us to peace-
fully coexist in society.
XII. OTHER ARGUMENTS REGARDING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In order to give a complete picture of the issues surrounding affirma-
tive action, one must address some of the other arguments that have been
presented in support of and against affirmative action policies in graduate
school and college admissions.
Many of the proponents of affirmative action have claimed the need
for benefits to be given to minorities in the admissions process because of
the heavy reliance on the standardized tests. Studies have suggested that
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is biased against minorities and puts
minorities "behind the eight ball" when applying for admission to law
268. Id.
269. But see Manny Klausner, The Sounds of Silence: Dole Retreating from Civil-Rights
Views, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June 23, 1996, at V1 (editorial indicating that Dole may not
continue to support the initiative activity).
270. Edwin Meese & Rhett DeHart, Need for Firm Stance on Affirmative Action,
WASH. TIMEs, June 17, 1996, at A19.
271. Denniston, supra note 256, at A6.
272. See id.
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schools.273 This is a valid concern, but the lower scores of minorities may
be more attributable to the low quality of their high schools rather than
the problem with standardized tests.
Protestors of affirmative action have raised the interesting idea that
affirmative action does not help minority students at all, but actually
hurts them by causing academic failure. 274 The theory is that minorities,
through the affirmative action programs of the universities, are admitted
to universities that are beyond their academic abilities.275 The result is
that minorities who could fare well at less prestigious universities end up
unsuccessful at elite schools. 276 It seems that it would be much better to
place all students with lower academic potential in universities where
they would be able to graduate, rather than having them fail at more
difficult universities simply because of affirmative action.
Another problem with affirmative action could be the possibility that
white students are actually receiving more of an advantage than minori-
ties. A recent study of Washington's public universities revealed that in
1994, 50.1% of the students admitted under alternative admission proce-
dures were white.277 Even more surprising, at Washington State almost
75% of the students admitted in the fall of 1994 under the alternative
admissions standards were white.278 This suggests that minorities should
be skeptical of affirmative action programs. But a group evaluation dem-
onstrates that minorities rely more on alternative admissions than whites
do, and minorities would be more hurt by the elimination of affirmative
action programs. 279
Some protestors of affirmative action have even turned to more radical
viewpoints. Professor Robert Klitgaard advances the classic argument
that all law school admissions should be based on merit.280 He concludes
273. When taken as a group, African-Americans tend to score about 200 points lower
than whites on the SAT. Also, children from families with lower incomes (between $10,000
to $20,000 a year) tend to score about 120 points lower than children from families with
higher incomes (between $50,000 and $60,000 a year). This tends to indicate that standard-
ized tests could be biased against minorities. Goodman, supra note 250, at Bl.
274. Kevin Butler, Affirmative Action Promotes Failure, DAILY TEXAN, Nov. 29, 1995,
at 4.
275. Id. In 1985, only 1928 minorities met the recommended SAT requirements of col-
leges in the United States. Through mathematics, we can see that each college only had
the ability to enroll at most 35 qualified minorities. Upon looking at the actual enrollment
figures of Harvard, we notice that since 1970, they have never admitted less than a hundred
African-Americans a year. Through their affirmative action programs, universities like
Harvard are being forced to accept minorities with lower academic potential. Id.
276. Id. The author uses Berkeley as an example. Seventy percent of the black stu-
dents at Berkeley fail to graduate, and it was probably not their fault. According to
Thomas Sowell, "[T]he policy of affirmative action places many of [the minorities] in aca-
demic environments that they cannot handle." Id.
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that "prior grades and standardized test scores are the best predictors of
later academic performance."'281 But he takes a much more controversial
viewpoint. Klitgaard contends that students should be admitted who
"'maximize the value added of the education an institution provides." '282
He believes that the admission of minorities who have lower grades and
lower board scores costs the institution "in terms of the academic per-
formance of students admitted. ' '283 Klitgaard argues that the number of
minorities in universities should be limited; he advocates a cost-benefit
analysis which "weighs the marginal cost in academic performance of ad-
mitting an additional black against the marginal benefit of that black's
presence in the elite institution instead of that of a higher-scoring
white. ''2 4 But Klitgaard's attempt to use economic analysis to decide af-
firmative action policies is rather simplified,285 and economics is not the
most important thing to consider when determining university admission
procedures. At times, diversity may be more important than the eco-
nomic costs.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The debate over affirmative action policies is one that will continue.
Public opinion suggests that affirmative action may be a disfavored doc-
trine286 and that it is not even supported by all minorities. 287 As eco-
nomic hardships for Americans continue and competition for
employment becomes fiercer, affirmative action programs are going to be
continually attacked. The courts have already noticed the potential eco-
nomic hardships that preferential programs may have on nonminorities.
They have even relaxed an important standing requirement, thus allowing
certain people to sue even when their claim that they did not receive a
job because of the preferential program was attenuated.288 Affirmative
action policies in graduate school admissions, as well as in other areas,
could be on their way out.
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Sooner or later, people will realize that we are perpetuating animosity
among the races by continuing these programs. We are causing minori-
ties to lose self-respect because of the continuing stigma attached to the
programs. Some may think that a minority student may have been
granted admission over someone with higher test scores and grades sim-
ply because of race. Affirmative action hurts everybody, and when there
are no winners in a public policy, it is not a good policy. Hopefully, af-
firmative action supporters will channel their efforts towards improving
high schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods. This way, graduating stu-
dents will be sufficiently prepared and will have performed well enough
to be admitted to college and graduate schools without the need for af-
firmative action programs.
